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LICENSEE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE
those offenders whose crimes are classified as petty offenses under pre-
vailing constitutional standards should not be deprived of the potential
collateral advantages of a military trial and should be excluded from the
O'Callahan rule.
RoGER GROOT
Patents-The Overruling of the Licensee Estoppel Doctrine
The favored status once enjoyed by patentees before the United States
Supreme Court has undergone considerable change in this century. Many
of the older concepts have been re-examined in light of the current state
of the patent system and the competing demands of other areas of the
law. For example, the exclusiveness of the patent grant is repugnant to
the free-competition teachings of antitrust policy. These factors have
prompted searching reappraisals of the privileges historically inherent
in the grant; in some cases, privilege-bestowing decisions of the past
have fallen.
More than one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court held that one
who had derived benefits from the use of another's patent was estopped to
deny its validity when sued by the owner for a share of the profits.' The
effect of the estoppel doctrine was to shield many questionable patents
from attack. In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins the Supreme Court recently dis-
approved this venerable doctrine. The Court stressed the strong public
interest in general circulation and use of ideas not entitled to patent
protection3 and reasoned that the estoppel doctrine was often a bar to
the most logical contestant of patentability.4
Adkins, while employed by Lear, had designed an apparatus increasing
the accuracy of gyroscopes. While his patent application was pending, he
licensed Lear to use his invention in return for royalties. After paying
royalties for approximately two years, Lear decided that the discovery by
Adkins had been fully anticipated by a prior patent and announced that
it would no longer pay royalties on production at one of its locations. Lear
later discontinued payments altogether. Shortly thereafter, Adkins finally
"Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 289 (1855).
289 S. Ct. 1902 (1969).
2Id. at 1910-11.
'Id. at 1911. The high costs of patent litigation and the specter of possible
treble damages for infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1964) can effectively deter
a third party from attacking a patent that he desires to use. Although the same
hardships may confront the licensee, he has more to gain since he is already util-
izing the patent and is saddled with royalty payments.
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obtained his patent and sued Lear for breach of the license agreement.
The licensee sought to prove its claim of invalidity of the patent, but the
California Supreme Court invoked the estoppel doctrine to preclude Lear
from asserting this defense.5
The estoppel doctrine had been widely applied by both federal and
state courts.' One theory that has been offered in justification of estoppel
is that one receiving bargained-for benefits under a contract cannot con-
test the validity of those benefits.7 Another theory compares the estopped
party to an agent who, having collected money owed his principal, cannot
contend that there was no debt and refuse to turn over the funds.8 In
other cases, an analogy has been drawn from the doctrine that a tenant
in possession cannot dispute the title of his landlord.0
The harshness of the estoppel doctrine was met in many jurisdictions
by various exceptions. One of these, the repudiation exception, permitted
a licensee to repudiate the license agreement, give notice to the licensor,
and then contest the validity of the patent.' 0 Continued use of the patent,
however, would give rise to a cause of action for infringement." Another
exception, eviction, generally applied only to exclusive licensees 12 and
arose when the patent was declared invalid in a suit between the patentee
and a third party.'3 Since the exclusive licensee contracts for a monopoly,
the determination of invalidity ousts him from that position because
outsiders can then use the invention. The result is a failure of considera-
tion for the license agreement,' 4 and the licensee can assert the eviction as
"Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1967),
rev'd, 89 S. Ct. 1902 (1969).
6 E.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827
(1950); Moore v. National Water-Tube Boiler Co., 84 F. 346 (C.C.D.N.J. 1897);
Thomson Spot Welder Co. v. Oldberg Mfg. Co., 234 Mich. 317, 207 N.W. 828
(1926); Davis Co. v. Burnsville Hosiery Mills, Inc., 242 N.C. 718, 89 S.E.2d 410
(1955) ; see 4 A. WALIER, PATENTS § 403 (Deller's 2d ed. 1965).7 Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 289, 293 (1855).
aId.
' White v. Lee, 14 F. 789, 790 (C.C.D. Mass. 1882) ; Wilder v. Adams, 29 F.
Cas. 1216, 1217-18 (No. 17,647) (C.C.D. Mass. 1846).
" Universal Rim Co. v. Scott, 21 F.2d 346 (N.D. Ohio 1922) ; Crew v. Flanagan,
242 Minn. 549, 65 N.W.2d 878 (1954). See Note, The Doctriw of Licensee
Repudiation in Patent Law, 63 YALE L.J. 125 (1953).
"At least one state required the repudiating licensee to make post-repudiation
use of the patent to allow the licensor the option to sue for infringement. Elgin
Nat. Watch Co. v. Bulova Watch Co., 281 App. Div. 219, 118 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1953).
2Appleton Toy & Furniture Co. v. Lehman Co. of America, 165 F.2d 801 (7th
Cir. 1948).
" Drackett Chem. Co. v. Chamberlain Co., 63 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1933).
"An exclusive licensee contracts for both a monopoly in the use of the patent
[Vol. 48
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a defense if sued by the licensor for royalties accruing subsequent to the
determination that the patent is invalid.
Other exceptions to the estoppel doctrine were carved out by several
landmark Supreme Court decisions, some of which left little doubt as to
what the ultimate disposition of the doctrine would be.' 5 In Westinghouse
Electric & Manufactuwring Co. v. Formica Insulation Co.,"6 Formica had
assigned his invention to his employer, Westinghouse. Prior to approval
of the patent application, the inventor terminated his employment and
started his own business, the Formica Company. The patent issued sub-
sequently to Westinghouse. Meanwhile, the Formica Company had be-
gun manufacturing substantially the same product covered by the patent.
Sued for infringement, Formica, although estopped from contesting the
patent's validity, was allowed to show that its only novelty was dependent
upon its encompassment of a two-step process of manufacturing. Since
Formica's product was not novel because it was manufactured by a one-
step process that embraced prior art, it did not fall within the protection
of Westinghouse's patent. The Court said: "Of course, the state of the
art can not be used to destroy the patent and defeat the grant, because
the assignor is estopped to do this. But the state of the art may be used
to construe and narrow the claims of the patent, conceding their validity.
' 'l7
Although the case involved an assignment and assignor estoppel, courts
have readily applied the Formica "narrowing" exception to license situa-
tions." This limitation upon the estoppel doctrine resulted in an anomaly
because it allowed attacks only on patents possessing some novelty while
leaving entirely worthless ones unaffected. 9 However, in many instances
and freedom from an infringement suit by the patentee. A non-exclusive licensee,
however, contracts only for freedom from an infringement suit; by definition, he
has no monopoly. Thus, where a third party succeeds in having the patent declared
invalid, the non-exclusive licensee still has his freedom from an infringement suit.
For a discussion of the eviction concept, see Note, 48 CoLum. L. REv. 1101 (1948).
"As the Court said in Lear: "Given the extent to which the estoppel principle
had been eroded by our prior decisions, we believe it clear that the patent owner-
even before this decision-could not confidently rely upon the continuing vitality
of the doctrine." 89 S. Ct. at 1913 n.19. See also Note, Estoppel to Deny Validity-
A Slender Reed, 23 N.Y.U. IxTRA. L. REv. 237 (1968).
10266 U.S. 342 (1924).17 Id. at 351.
"8E.g., New Wrinkle, Inc. v. John L. Armitage & Co., 277 F.2d 409 (3d Cir.
1960); Midland Steel Prods. Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 174 F.2d 541 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 892 (1949).
"o [I]f a patent had some novelty Formica permitted the old owner to defend
an infringement action by showing that the invention's novel aspects did not
extend to include the old owner's product; on the other hand, if a patent
had no novelty at all, the old owner could not defend successfully since he
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it necessarily restricted the scope of protection previously enjoyed by
many patentees.
Twenty-one years after Formica, the Court made additional inroads
into the estoppel doctrine. In Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Manufacturing
Co.,20 the Court held that an assignor of a patent, sued for infringement
by the assignee, could defend by showing that the alleged infringing device
was copied from a prior patent now expired. The assignor had made the
invention sued upon, had assigned his patent application to a third
party who in turn assigned it to Scott, and subsequently had begun
his own company that produced and sold essentially the same product
covered by the patent. Necessarily admitting that the patent that he
had assigned was worthless, the assignor contended that his machine
was a copy of a prior patent issued in 1912. The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, reversing the district court, which had invoked the
estoppel doctrine, held that the Formica "narrowing" exception allowed
the assignor to show the prior art to limit the claims of the assigned
patent; and since the earlier expired patent completely anticipated the
assigned patent, the latter was limited to no claim at all.2 The Supreme
Court affirmed the holding of no infringement, but on new grounds. It
pointed out that once a patent expires, the invention is dedicated to the
public. Therefore, the estoppel doctrine could not prevent one from using
the invention of an expired patent because
[t]he public has invested in such free use by the grant of a monopoly
to the patentee for a limited time. Hence any attempted reservation
or continuation in the patentee or those claiming under him of the
patent monopoly, after the patent expires, whatever the legal device
employed, runs counter to the policy and purpose of the patent laws.
2 2
This exception to the estoppel doctrine has since been applied to license
cases. 23 Thus, while Formica avoided the estoppel doctrine by allowing
a licensee to show his device to be outside the scope of the licensor's nar-
would be obliged to launch the direct attack on the patent that Formica
seemed to forbid.
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 89 S. Ct. 1902, 1908 (1969).
20326 U.S. 249 (1945).
2 Automatic Paper Mach. Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 147 F.2d 608 (3d Cir.),
aff'd sub mwm. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
22326 U.S. at 256.
" E.g., Hall Laboratories, Inc. v. National Aluminate Corp., 224 F.2d 303
(3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956); Hooker Chem. Corp. v. Velsicol
Chem. Corp., 235 F. Supp. 412 (W.D. Tenn. 1964) (dictum).
[Vol. ,48
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rowly construed patent, Scott evaded the doctrine by permitting licensees
to prove that they were using solely the ideas of an expired patent.
Another exception to licensee estoppel was grounded specifically upon
antitrust policy. In Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.,2" the
Supreme Court was faced with a license agreement containing a naked
price restriction, lawful under the Sherman Act only if supported by a valid
patent.25 The licensor-patentee had sued for royalties and an injunction
restraining sales outside the terms of the license agreement. Reversing the
lower court's invocation of the estoppel doctrine, 6 the Supreme Court held
that the estoppel rule, whether state or federal, must yield to the public
policy of the Sherman Act precluding enforcement of such unlawful agree-
ments.27
Five years later, the Court went further in deciding Edward Katzinger
Co. v. Chicago Metallic Manufacturing Co.2" and MacGregor v. Westing-
house Electric & Manufacturing Co.,"9 both of which also involved license
agreements with price restrictions. Unlike the licensor in Sola, who had
sought to enforce the provisions of the license controlling prices, the
licensors in Katainger and MacGregor were seeking only royalties; in-
deed, the licensors had made no attempt to enforce the price-fixing
clauses.30 The Court held that the entire agreement was tainted because
the price-fixing and royalty provisions ware not severable: "Consequently,
when one part of the consideration is unenforceable because in violation of
law, its integrated companion must go with it."3 Therefore, the licensees
were allowed to attack the validity of the patents. The above exceptions
and others that were developed to the estoppel doctrine indicated judicial
recognition of the conflict between the stability of contracts and the
patentees' privileges on one side, and, on the other, the right of public
access to ideas not protected by a valid patent.
The public right of free access to technological improvements falling
short of patentability was set out in two far-reaching companion cases,
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.32 and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
" 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
25 id. at 175.
"' Jefferson Elec. Co. v. Sola Elec. Co., 125 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1941), rev'd,
317 U.S. 173 (1942).
-'317 U.S. at 175, 177.
28329 U.S. 394 (1947).
29329 U.S. 402 (1947).
20Id. at 412 & n.4 (dissenting opinion).
"329 U.S. at 401.
92376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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Stiffel Co.3" Although these were infringement suits not involving
licenses, the Court in Lear relied heavily upon them. In both cases,
patentees brought actions in an Illinois district court. They alleged that
the defendants were selling articles identical in design to those of the
patentees and that these actions constituted infringement and unfair
competition. The defendants contended that the patents were invalid; the
district court so held but applied the state law of unfair competition and
granted injunctions and ordered accountings for damages. The unfair
competition holdings rested upon customer confusion over source of the
products. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in both
cases."' On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that while
a state may impose certain requirements such as labeling to prevent mis-
leading consumers, state prohibition against copying unpatented articles
is incompatible with federal patent laws. Justice Black stated that "[m] ere
inability of the public to tell two identical articles apart is not enough to
support an injunction against copying or an award of damages for
copying that which the federal patent laws permit to be copied."3' The
analogy to licensee estoppel is clear: Whether the estoppel doctrine is a
matter of federal or state law, it cannot, by barring potential litigants,
extend patent protection to ideas that federal patent policy demands shall
have no protection.
The Supreme Court had previously indicated in Altvater v. Freeman2 0
that the federal courts in infringement cases should not hold patents valid
if such a holding is unnecessary to disposition of a case. The Court,
citing an earlier case,8 7 indicated that because there would not be any
justiciable controversy8 it was improper upon a determination of no in-
fringement to proceed further and hold the patent valid. On the other
hand, even if a court finds no infringement, it may proceed to find the
patent invalid, for such a determination serves the public interest."0
" 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
" Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 376
U.S. 225 (1964); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th
Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
1 376 U.S. at 232. For a discussion of these cases and the impact of federal
patent and copyright policy on the law of unfair competition, see Treece, Patent
Policy and Preemption: The Stiffel & Compco Cases, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 80
(1964); Comment, Does Stiffel Stifle the Law of Unfair Competitionf, 37 U.
CoLo. L. REV. 86 (1964).
36319 U.S. 359, 363 (1943).
8 Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939).
If an alleged infringer can prove that he is not infringing, he has no reason to
attack the patent's validity.
"' Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327 (1945).
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Lear's contribution to the demise of patentee privileges is not limited
to the overruling of the estoppel doctrine. Besides allowing Lear to attack
the patent on remand, the Court made significant new law-and raised
profound new questions-in the area of license contracts generally. Adkins
had filed his initial patent application in 1954; the license agreement was
consummated in 1955; and the patent issued in 1960.40 The Court was
faced with a provision in the contract calling for Lear to pay royalties
until such time as the patent was held invalid. Acknowledging the bene-
fits derived by Lear from the pre-patent licensing, the Court declared that
Lear would not be liable for royalties accruing after the 1960 patent
issued if he could prove it invalid.41 The parties' contract was deemed
to be "no more controlling on this issue than is the State's doctrine of
estoppel, which is also rooted in contract principles."'4 The Court was
concerned with the frustration of federal policies that would result if
licensees were required to continue royalty payments while challenging
patents in the courts. Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, cited
the probable dilatory legal tactics by licensors, the incentive to attack
patents that early freedom from royalties would provide licensees, and
the undermining effect that similar contract provisions would have on the
federal policy favoring full and free use of ideas in the public domain.43
The Court also raised, but did not decide, the question whether Adkins
was entitled to 1955-1960 pre-patent royalties. Determination of such
an issue ultimately will depend upon "whether, and to what extent, the
States may protect the owners of unpatented inventions who are willing
to disclose their ideas to manufacturers only upon payment of royalties.""
The Court deferred decision until the state courts could consider the
problem.
Our decision today will, of course, require the state courts to re-
consider the theoretical basis of their decisions enforcing the con-
tractual rights of inventors and it is impossible to predict the extent to
which this reevaluation may revolutionize the law of any particular
State in this regard.... Given the difficulty and importance of this
task, [our definition] should be undertaken only after the state courts
have, after fully focussed inquiry, determined the extent to which
they will respect the contractual rights of such inventors in the future.
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 89 S. Ct. 1902, 1904 (1969).
,11d. at 1911-13.
12 Id. at 1912.
'Id. at 1912-13.
" Id. at 1913.
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Indeed, on remand, the California courts may well reconcile the
competing demands of patent and contract law in a way which would
not warrant further review in this Court.
45
The pronouncements on royalties were not necessary to disposition
of the case; indeed, as Mr. Justice White, concurring in part, indicated,
these issues were not even before the Court.4" That these questions were
nevertheless reached has implications worth probing. Since Stiffel and
Compco prohibit patent-type protection for ideas not shielded by the patent
laws, do they not also prohibit the states from enforcing contracts for
payment to inventors in return for disclosures of unpatented ideas? Mr.
Justice Black, concurring in part and dissenting in part, answered in the
affirmative.
4 7
Since jurisdiction over suits involving royalty contracts, absent
diversity, lies exclusively with the state courts,4 it was appropriate to
allow them preliminary consideration of this problem. However, this
consideration may well be perfunctory in view of the Supreme Court's
inclinations to restrict patent protection together with the limitations im-
posed by the Stiffel-Compco mandate. If invalidity of the patent disallows
royalties after it issues, there seems to be little reason to allow royalties
for the period prior to issuance. Moreover, since issued patents are
presumed valid49 and represent a property right,0° payments for their use
until they are actually adjudicated invalid arguably rest on stronger ground
than do payments for use of ideas not yet patented.
An appealing argument might be made that until a patent grant is
issued, the invention is beyond the reach of federal law and, therefore,
the rights of contracting parties should be defined exclusively by the
states. However, this contention is apparently foreclosed by the hold-
ings in Stiffel, Compco and Lear that because the federal patent laws
deny protection to some ideas, there must be free access to them.
Privileges of the patent grant were affected by Lear in three ways.
'5 Id.
,Id. at 1915.
"T Id. at 1914. justice Black was joined by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Douglas.
, Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496 (1926); Albright v. Teas, 106 U.S.
613 (1882); see Note, The Jurisdiction of State Courts over Cases Involving
Patents, 31 CoLum. L. Rnv. 461 (1931).
"' Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U.S. 689, 695-96 (1886); H. Wenzel Tent & Duck
Co. v. White Stag Mfg. Co., 199 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1952); 35 U.S.C. § 282
(Supp. III, 1968).
" James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1881).
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First, the final rites administered to the estoppel doctrine will allow more
patent attacks. Second, excusing post-patent royalties if attacks are
successful will provide licensees additional incentive to litigate. Finally, the
decision portends a probable loss of royalties for the pre-patent period
as well. Apparently, the Supreme Court's past benevolent attitude toward
the patent system has given way to a disposition of bare tolerance; no
doubt, additional incursions into patentees' privileges will be made. The
ultimate result will depend upon the extent to which the patent system
and conflicting policies, such as those of the antitrust laws, can peace-
fully coexist.
JAMES E. CLINE
Poverty Law-Unconstitutionality of Residence Requirements for
Welfare Assistance
The United States Supreme Court in Shapira v. Thompson1 recently
held that one-year waiting period requirements as a condition precedent
to receiving public assistance violate the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment by discriminating between two classes of citi-
zens on the basis of residence.' In three separate cases' district courts,
holding the residence requirements unconstitutional, had found that the
appellees, the applicants rejected for public assistance, were eligible for
benefits in every respect except for the requirement of residence for a
full year prior to application. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower
courts that the interests promoted by the classification and asserted by
the appellants were either interests that cannot be constitutionally pro-
moted by government or that are not "compelling" state interests.4
The appellants' primary justification for the waiting periods was pro-
tection of the budgetary integrity of state public assistance programs.
They defended the residence provisions on the fiscal grounds that people
who require welfare assistance during their first year of residence in a
1394 U.S. 618 (1969).
Id. at 638-42.
' On certiorari the Court consolidated Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22
(D.D.C. 1967) ; Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1967) ; and Thomp-
son v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967). The inclusion of the case from
the District of Columbia was based on Boiling v. Sharpe, 374 U.S. 497 (1954),
in which the Court held that the fifth amendment's due process clause incorporated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 394 U.S. at 641-42. See
also Green v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967),
which was not appealed.
'394 U.S. at 627.
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